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CASES NOTED

A NEWSMAN'S PRIVILEGE-THE FIRST AMENDMENT*
A Black news reporter for the New York Times, specializing in reporting on the Black Panther Party, was served a subpoena to appear
and testify before the Grand Jury of the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California.' The grand jury was engaged in a
general investigation of the Black Panther Party to determine the possibility of its involvement in criminal activities contrary to federal law.'
After protesting the scope of the subpoena, the reporter was served a second subpoena which required only his attendance before the grand jury.3
The court denied the reporter's motion to quash both subpoenas and directed compliance with the second subpoena subject to a protective order. 4
* This note is directed primarily to an analysis of the first amendment issues involved
in the instant case. Grand jury functions, incorporation of prior grand jury activity, and the
effect of the expiration of a grand jury term are not within the scope of this note.
1. On February 2, 1970, Earl Caldwell was served with a subpoena directing him to
appear before the grand jury accompanied by certain papers. The papers included all notes
and tape recordings of interviews covering more than a one-year period which reflected
statements made by officials of the Black Panther Party pertaining to the aims and purposes
of said organization, and the activities of the organization, its officers, staff, personnel, and
members, including specifically, but not limited to, interviews given by David Hilliard and
Raymond "Masai" Hewitt. Brief of The American Civil Liberties Union, as Amid Curiae at
3, Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
The power of the Grand Jury and the United States Supreme Court position has been
summarized as follows:
[I]t is clearly recognized that the giving of testimony and the attendance upon court
or grand jury in order to testify are public duties which every person within the
jurisdiction of the Government is bound to perform upon being properly summoned,
and for performance of which he is entitled to no further compensation than that
which the statutes provide. The personal sacrifice involved is a part of the necessary
contribution of the individual to the welfare of the public.
Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919).
2. The general nature of the investigation being conducted by the grand jury is significant because the vast scope of the investigation limits the applicability of the decision. The
major thrust of the opinion, however, was a realization that newsmen have a need for confidential sources of information and that certain conduct abridges first amendment rights. The
disclosure of the source of information may discourage the participation of those desiring to
remain anonymous and deny a dissident group access to the press, deny the newsmen access
to newsworthy material, and prevent the public from receiving uninhibited views. See, e.g.,
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957)
(police-informant). See also N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
3. This is the basis for the reporter's contention that the forced appearance would cause
the loss of his sources of information. This additional subpoena ad testificandum was served
on March 16, 1970, with the government subsequently withdrawing the subpoena of February
2, 1970. Brief of The American Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae at 3, Caldwell v.
United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
4. The protective order issued by the District Court provided:
(1) That . . . he shall not be required to reveal confidential associations, sources or
information received, developed or maintained by him as a professional journalist in the course of his efforts to gather news for dissemination to the public
through the press or other news media.
(2) That specifically, without limiting paragraph (1), Mr. Caldwell shall not be
required to answer questions concerning statements made to him or information
given to him by members of the Black Panther Party unless such statements or
information were given to him for publication or public disclosure.
(3) That, to assure the effectuation of this order, Mr. Caldwell shall be permitted to
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Thereafter, the reporter filed a notice of appeal, which the Government
contested as interlocutory.' The Government's motion to dismiss was
granted without opinion. The term of the grand jury having expired, the
reporter was served a new subpoena.6 The reporter again moved to quash
the subpoena. The court denied the motion to quash and expressly directed
the reporter to appear before the grand jury with the shield of the protective order. The reporter, claiming constitutional protection, refused to
obey the court order and was held in contempt. 7 On appeal to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, held, reversed and remanded: Where it is shown that the public's first amendment right to be
informed would be jeopardized by requiring a journalist to submit to
secret grand jury interrogation, the government must demonstrate a compelling need for the witness' presence before the judicial process properly
can issue to require attendance. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081
(9th Cir. 1970).
Every reported case9 prior to Caldwell has held that, absent a statutory privilege, 0 a news reporter, subpoenaed to appear in a judicial proconsult with his counsel at any time he wishes during the course of his appearance before the grand jury ....
Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 1970).
5. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1964) with 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1964).
6. The subpoena ad testificandum was served on May 22, 1970. All proceedings had in
connection with the earlier subpoenas were incorporated into the record of the proceedings
concerning this last subpoena. A new order directing attendance was issued containing the
previous protective provisions.
7. On May 22, 1970, Caldwell refused to appear before the grand jury and a show cause
order was issued on the same day. On June 5, 1970, he appeared in court and again refused
to testify.
8. The court limited its holding thusly:
We go no further than to announce this general rule. As we noted at the outset,
this is a case of first impression. The courts can learn much about the problems
in this area as they gain more experience in dealing with them. For the present we
lack the omniscience to spell out the details of the Government's burden or the type
of proceeding that would accommodate efforts to meet that burden. The fashioning
of specific rules and procedures appropriate to the particular case can better be left
to the District Court under its retained jurisdiction ...
Finally we wish to emphasize what must already be dear: the rule of this case
is a narrow one.
Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d at 1089-90 (9th Cir. 1970).
9. See, e.g., People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 (1956) (the
leading decision in this country on the issue involved in the case noted herein); Brewster v.
Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 20 F.R.D. 416 (D.C. Mass. 1957); Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 591
(1970); Guest and Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing their
Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 18 (1969). See also, Beaver, The Newsman's Code-The Claim of
Privilege and Everyman's Right to Evidence, 47 ORE. L. REV. 243 (1968); Note, Privileged
Communications-News Media-A "Shield Statute For Oregon", 46 ORE. L. REV. 99 (1966).
10. The following state statutes, as they appear in Guest and Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 18 (1969), have
been enacted to obtain the desired result: ALA. CODE RECOMPILED tit. 7, § 370 (1960);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (Supp. 1969); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1964); CAL.
Evm. CODE ANN. § 1070 (West 1966); IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1733 (1968); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 421.100 (1962); LA. REV. STAT. §§ 45:1451-54 (Cum. Supp. 1969) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 35,
§ 2 (1965) ; MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.945(1) (1954) ; MONT. REV. CODE ANN. tit. 93, ch. 601-2
(1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21,-29 (Supp. 1969); OHot REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.12

CASES NOTED

ceeding" has neither a common law evidentiary privilege, 12 nor a constitutional right, to withhold the names of confidential sources and/or
information obtained therefrom. In particular, an interpretation of the
first amendment 5 to afford a newsman 14 the right to withhold the names
of confidential sources or the information received therefrom has been examined and expressly rejected.' 5 In each case, the courts have directly or
indirectly noted that the fair administration of justice is hindered by an
extension of first amendment rights."6
(1964) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 330 (1958). The first such statute was enacted in Maryland
in 1896. Federal legislation has also been suggested in this area but has met with little or no
success. See S.R. 1851, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) ; H.R. 8519, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) ;
H.R. 778, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). See compilation of related material in Guest and
Stanzler, supra at 20, 21.
11. These proceedings include both civil and criminal actions and cover the discovery
process and grand jury investigations. See, e.g., the cases cited in notes 9 supra and 15 infra.
12. The nature of the privilege asserted is similar to that of the police-informant privilege.
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967) ; Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957). The
newsman is the person asserting the privilege to protect both his source and the public's right
to information through the use of such concept. This differs from the traditional common-law
privileges, i.e., attorney-client, doctor-patient, in that the newsman may, at his discretion,
violate the privileged relationship by disclosing certain informaton when it may be beneficial
for him to do so. The public and the source of information will not be protected if the newsman considers it in his best interest to breach the confidence.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. I, "Freedom of the Press" provision. The inclusion of a newsman's privilege in the first amendment absent any express language, would make the first
amendment fully operable as does the "exclusionary rule" in situations of illegal search and
seizure under the fourth amendment. Although this analogy is somewhat strained, the basic
concept of interpretation to create a restraint on conduct that is contrary to the essence of a
free society, absent express constitutional language to that effect is present in both situations.
Both concepts make fundamental rights fully operative.
14. The reporter is the person who directly receives the protection. See note 10 supra.
Any suggestion that newsmen, as an occupational group, inherently possess rights beyond
those of other citizens is untenable.
[I]t would be difficult to rationalize a rule that would create special constitutional

rights for those possessing credentials as newsgatherers which would not conflict with
the equal protection concepts also found in the Constitution.
State v. Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244, 248, 436 P.2d 729, 731 (1968).

15. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958) ; Murphy
v. Colorado, 356 U.S. 843 (1961) (cert. denied); In re Goodfader's Appeal, 45 Hawaii 317,
367 P.2d 472 (1961) ; In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963) ; State v. Buchanan, 250

Ore. 244, 436 P.2d 729, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968). The United States Supreme Court
has avoided considering the point by denying certiorari each time the question has been presented. In Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915), the Supreme Court upheld the right
of an editor to refuse to disclose the source of certain information. The decision, however, was
based on the fifth amendment (self-incrimination), not the first amendment as presented in
the instant case.
16. See, e.g., Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 549 (2d Cir. 1958):
If an additional First Amendment liberty-the freedom of the press-is here involved, we do not hesitate to conclude that it too.must give place under the Constitution to a paramount public interest in the fair administration of justice.
Cf. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946);

Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (dissenting opinion); Chambers v. Baltimore &
Ohio R. Co., 207 U.S. 142 (1907) ; Patterson v. Colorado ex tel. Attorney General, 205 U.S.
454 (1907). These decisions relate to the functions of the judicial process and the application
of the freedom of the press therein.
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Initially, the court in Caldwell had to determine whether the first
amendment could be interpreted to afford a newsman the right to withhold information to insure freedom of the press; 7 and, if so, whether the
first amendment required more than the protective order issued by the
district court.' The reporter maintained that the inevitable effect 9 of the
subpoena would be a suppression of vital first amendment freedoms by
driving a wedge of distrust and silence between the news media and the
Black Panthers.' The government factually contested this view, stating
that the Black Panthers actually depend on the mass media to maintain
themselves in the public eye and thus use the media to gain public support.2 ' As the court stated, the government's position was not responsive
to the first amendment argument. The first amendment envisions the
widest possible distribution of information from, and to, diverse sources.22
Courts have long recognized that the mere journalistic classification
of material as "news" warrants no special constitutional treatment.28
Rather, the essence of constitutional protection for written work revolves
around the publication or other public dissemination of such material.
Once the material is deemed within the constitutional safeguard, any conduct which tends to restrain or hamper a free press carries a strong presumption of unconstitutionality, unless justified on some legally sufficient
basis.2" The major thrust of the first amendment is the prevention of conduct that may create prior restraints upon publication. 2 The first amendment also prohibits restraints subsequent to publication,2 6 and protects
the public's right to receive information.2 7 The courts have not only
17. 434 F.2d at 1083.
18. See note 4 supra.
19. Cf., Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936), wherein the Supreme

Court indicated that indirect as well as direct suppression of first amendment rights cannot
be tolerated.
20. The reporter had been covering the Black Panthers since the movement started.
Initially, he had been received with hesitation and extreme caution, but gradually won the
confidence and trust of the party leaders and the rank-and-file members. Because of this relationship, the Panthers now discuss party views and activities freely with him. This relationship
has also enabled him to write informed and balanced articles concerning party matters unavailable to most other newsmen. The reporter maintained that his appearance before a secret
hearing open to any information he might possess would cause the party to fear the confidential relationship and become reluctant to speak with any reporter, thereby denying the
public access to divergent points of view. Reporters could be transformed into constant government investigators should they be forced to reveal any and all information concerning the
Panthers. See 434 F.2d at 1084.
21. Id.
22. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) ; Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252 (1941); see also Barron, Access to the Press: A New First Amendment Right, 80 HAIv.
L. REv.1641 (1967).

23. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
24. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). See also United States v.
New York Times,-

S.Ct. -

(1971).

25. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
26. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
27. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S.
141 (1942).

CASES NOTED

attempted to invalidate intentional conduct that directly retards a freeflowing press, but have invalidated conduct that indirectly hampers the
press as well.28
The reporter's position, in the instant case, was that his appearance
before the grand jury would destroy his confidential relationship with the
Black Panther Party and breach the trust that he had developed through
his extensive work with them. The essence of his contention was that
although the grand jury session was not intended to hamper the press, it
would inevitably result in an indirect restraint.2 9 The Supreme Court has
consistently recognized the need for privacy in certain personal relationships and anonymity has been upheld where necessary. ° The general investigation by the grand jury was found to be within the definition of an
invalid restraint operating indirectly to hamper the press,' and the protective order was therefore inadequate to protect the reporter's rights.
Having established a Constitutional privilege, the court then adopted
the traditional "balancing test '8 2 to resolve the conflict between the competing public interests of freedom of the press and the necessity of grand
jury investigations. In this regard, however, several 8 writers have implied
that the application of a balancing test is improper when dealing with
such vital freedoms as those protected by the first amendment. It is submitted that a more appropriate approach would be to begin with the presumption that first amendment rights are absolute and that, therefore,
any encroachment upon them, by forced testimony, would require a clear
28. The courts have viewed conduct that tends to hamper the press unfavorably and
have attempted to alleviate any threat to our nation's press. In New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Supreme Court recognized that the threat of civil damages in libel
suits may tend to obstruct newspaper discussion of public officials. The Court established a
heavier burden of proof in libel actions to allow greater freedom of discussion in this area.
See also American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1935).
29. The reporter's position is analogous to the police-informant relationship. McCray v.
Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957). The Supreme
Court has recognized the need for certain confidential relationships and realized that the disclosure of such to public view may destroy the essential confidential nature. A similar view is
presented in N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), wherein the Court found that a
public disclosure of membership lists of certain groups may force some individuals to curtail
their activities in such groups. See also, Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) ; Talley v.
California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) ; Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
30. See note 29 supra. See also Comment, The ConstitutionalRight to Anonymity: Free
Speech, Disclosure, and the Devil, 70 YALE L.J. 1084 (1961).
31. It is submitted that the court states the basis of the decision in broad general terms
with disconnected quotations from questionable authority. For example, the court utilized
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), wherein the Supreme Court by using the
"penumbra theory" developed that decision to meet the facts of the particular case. The instant holding reflects the use of broad, ambiguous terms which could arguably be utilized to
reach the desired result given any factual pattern concerning the first amendment.
32. When an abridgment of the first amendment flows inadvertently from an otherwise
lawful governmental action, the resolution involves a balancing of the particular interests.
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
33. See, e.g., Guest and Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument For Newsmen Concealing
Their Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 18, 28 (1969).
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showing of a compelling interest to the contrary. 4 This process would be
consistent with the reasoning of the Supreme Court,85 and could be argued
forcefully in that there is an absence of a clear constitutional basis for
the power to compel testimony.8" The common law basis of determining
the existence of a privilege should not control; rather a principle similar
to that of the fifth amendment prohibition against self-incrimination
should be followed. Certainly the fifth amendment serves to hamper the
truth-finding process, but a refusal to testify on the basis of selfincrimination takes precedence over compulsory testimony. 7 In the instant case, the court, while stating that the balancing test was applicable,
nevertheless required the Government to make a clear showing of a compelling and overriding interest. 88
There is no question as to the propriety of the grand jury using its
subpoena power to compel testimony39 However, this power is subject to
mitigating circumstances. Under certain situations a substantial individual interest may outweigh the search for truth and exempt one from
attending and giving testimony.4 0 The provisions of the first amendment
should be applied as a limitation upon grand jury power in order to provide the nation a truly "free press."'" The subjecting of newsmen to general, undefined grand jury investigations can sever the trust and confidence established between a reporter and his sources of information.
Thus, in weighing the competing interests involved, society gains benefits
from a full recognition of "freedom of the press" that clearly outweigh
the detrimental effects of a limitation upon general grand jury investigations.
The instant decision is strictly limited to the particular factual situation presented and a further limitation is created by the particular parties
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610 (1960); United States v. Bryan, 339
U.S. 323 (1950). This would also be analogous to the burden required to force the disclosure
of a police-informant. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967) ; Roviaro v. United States, 353
U.S. 53 (1957).
36. This, of course, presupposes a judicial proceeding wherein the criminal defendant is
not forced to forego the right to confront a witness. Even here, however, the police-informant
relationship by analogy may alleviate the problems.
37. See generally Guest and Stanzler, supra note 10.
38. The court referred to Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
910 (1958), which was the first decision to recognize the value and merit of the constitutional
argument and require a showing of a compelling need for specific testimony. The test is: Does
the information sought go to the heart of the case? Subsequent decisions have made reference
to the Garland test but all have manipulated the situation and found the information sought
to be essential. See note 15 supra.
39. See Blair v. United States, supra note 1. See also Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S.
364 (1966) (and cases cited therein) ; Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932) ; Hale
v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
40. See United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1930) ; Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273
(1919).
41. Cf., Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).

CASES NOTED

involved. 42 The court, treating the case as one of first impression, gave no
specific criteria for future reference other than that of announcing a general rule without specifying what the government must show to negate the
newsman's privilege.4" It is submitted that the court employed questionable authority to support general statements in order to achieve the desired result.44 Had the court utilized more precise legal reasoning to
develop the opinion with a firm foundation, this decision could have had
far-reaching effects. However, later decisions have either rejected the extended interpretation of "freedom of the press" and followed prior precedent45 or have limited the application of Caldwell to the factual situation
presented.4 6
R. FRED LEWIS

EXTENSION OF LIABILITY IN THE BAILMENT FOR HIRE
Plaintiff, United Airlines, was in need of a method by which passengers requiring wheelchairs could be loaded onto and unloaded from its
aircraft. This need was revealed to the defendant, W. E. Johnson Equipment Co., Inc., and the two entered into a month-to-month lease agreement for a forklift type hoist, with lessor furnishing all maintenance, repair, and service. Fifteen days later, while a passenger was deplaning, the
hoist fell and the passenger was severely injured. Plaintiff settled with the
passenger and then brought suit against the Johnson Equipment Company
for indemnification, alleging negligent maintenance and breach of implied
42. The court stated: "It is not every news source that is as sensitive as the Black
Panther Party. . . ." 434 F.2d at 1090.
43. See note 8 supra.
The only suggestion of the Government's burden to negate such a privilege was advanced
by the reporter.
.. . the Government must show at least: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to
believe the journalist has information, (2) specifically relevant to an identified episode
that the grand jury has some factual basis for investigating as a possible violation of
designated criminal statutes within its jurisdiction, and (3) that the government has
no alternative sources of the same or equivalent information whose use would not
entail an equal degree of incursion upon First Amendment freedoms. Once this
minimal showing has been made, it remains for the courts to weigh the precise degree of investigative need that thus appears against the demonstrated degree of harm
to First Amendment interests involved in compelling the journalist's testimony.
Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1090 (9th Cir. 1970). See People v. Dohrnm, Case
No. 69-3808, May 20, 1970, Cir. Ct. Cook County, Calif., Criminal Division.
44. See note 31 supra.
45. See, In re Pappas, 39 U.S.L.W. 2444 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1971).

We adhere to the view that there exists no constitutional newsman's privilege, either
qualified or absolute, to refuse to appear and testify before a court or grand jury.
In re Pappas, supra at 2444.
46. United States v. Calley, 39 U.S.L.W. 2463 (Army General Court Martial, 5th Jud.
Cir. 1971).

